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COMMENT

COMMENT
UNITED STATES VS. BUTLER ET AL., RECEIVERS OF
HOOSAC MILLS CORPORATION
By ERNEST R. BALTZELL*

The importance, in American political history, of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in United States of America,
Petitioner, vs. William A. Butler et al. Receivers of Hoo§ac Mills Corporation, will be determined by subsequent events. In constitutional
law, it will be one of the leading cases, unless political action renders
it academic. The opinions in the case raise the issue as to the proper
function of the Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutionality
of statutes and, for the first time, give some judicial meaning to the
"general welfare" clause of the Constitution.
The United States presented a claim to the receivers for processing
and floor taxes on cotton levied under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
The receivers recommended disallowance. The District Court found the
taxes valid and ordered them paid. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, Stone,
Brandeis and Cardozo, J.J., dissenting.
The declared purpose of the Act, i. e., to give to agricultural products
the purchasing power which they had in designated periods (as to
cotton, between August, 1909, and July, 1914) and thus eliminate the
disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, and
the means authorized to accomplish this purpose, i. e., a levy of processing taxes and their appropriation to producers of agricultural commodities upon their agreement to restrict production, are common
knowledge.
The wisdom or policy of the Act is wholly irrelevant to any consideration of the case. Research is of little value in commenting on the
decision.
It will not be denied that, at the time of the enactment, the plight
of agriculture constituted an evil affecting the general welfare, and that
the statute, whatever its wisdom, attempted a remedy
The majority opinion disposes of the preliminary issue as to the
standing of the respondents to object to the validity of the tax, holding
that they may do so because they "resist the exaction as a step in an
unauthorized plan" and do not seek, as mere taxpayers, to restrain the
expenditure of public funds. The Court is not as wise as Solomon, and
finds it impossible to divide the statute into two statutes, one levying
an excise tax and the other making an appropriation. The aim of the
statute is foreign to the procurement of revenue for the support of the
government, and its operation shows the exaction to be, not a tax, but
*Of the Indianapolis Bar.
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the necessary means for the intended control of agricultural production
and a mere incident to its regulation.
The majority next mquire whether the Act is authorized by any other
power delegated to Congress-the "controlling question" in the casefor the Act may be without authority under the taxing power and
still be constitutional under another delegated power.
The function of the Supreme Court is first explained. The Court
does not assume a power to overrule or control the action of Congress.
It does not posess a veto power similar to that of the President. The
Constitution being the supreme law of the land, all legislation must conform to it. All that the Court does is place the statute whose constitutionality is questioned beside the Article of the Constitution invoked as a grant of authority, and decide whether the former agrees
with the latter. The Court announces its considered judgment, and
neither approves nor disapproves legislative policy When it has determined whether the statute contravenes or conforms to the Constitution, its duty ends. The question is what powers are given by the Constitution to Congress, and not what powers ought to be given to it, each
State having all governmental powers except such as the Constitution
confers on the United States, denies to the States, or reserves to the
people.
The commerce clause is found irrelevant, and it is implicitly admitted by both opinions that the Act may be justified, if at all, only
under the general welfare clause.
The power "to lay and collect taxes * * * and provide for * * *

general welfare of the United States" does not authorize legislation for
the general welfare, except by means of taxation and appropriation.
Otherwise the federal system of government designed by the Constitution would be destroyed. The true construction is that Congress has
power "to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the
nation's debts and making provision for the general welfare." The necessary implication is that public funds may be appropriated for the general welfare, the power to appropriate being as broad as the power to
tax. But the appropriation must be for the general welfare. On the
other hand the clause is an independent source of power, for it is not
meaningless. The views of Hamilton and Story are thus adopted. Congress may appropriate funds if the appropriation provides for the general welfare, whether or not the expenditure is authorized by any other
delegated power.
The majority find it unnecessary to define the scope of general welfare, or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture
falls within it, for the Act "invades the reserved powers of the states."
It is "a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production,
a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government." The
Constitution gives no power to Congress to regulate agricultural produc-
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tion. The power is reserved to the states. Such legislation by Congress
is, therefore, forbidden. The Act is objectionable for the same reason
that, under the pretext of raising revenue Congress cannot regulate the
conduct of manufacturing and trading (Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U. S. 20, and Hill v. Wallace, 259 U S. 44), cannot regulate the practice of a profession (Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5), and cannot
impose sanctions for violation of state law respecting the local sale of
liquor (United States v. Constantine, decided December 11, 1935).
Although the Act purports to effect mere voluntary compliance, it is
in fact coercive because compliance is secured by the fear of loss of
benefits, the power to confer or withold unlimited benefits being the
power to coerce or destroy The refusal of a minority to comply does
not prove the lack of coercion, for the coercive features of the Bankhead Cotton Act disclose the coercive purpose of the so-called processing
tax. Admitting the plan to be one for purely voluntary cooperation,
Congress cannot purchase compliance which it is powerless to command.
It cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do directly, and an emergency is no justification for ignoring constitutional limitations.
If the Act is constitutional, the regulation of all industry throughout
the United States may be accomplished in a similar manner, the federal
system of government will be destroyed, and Congress will become a
parliament of the whole people with only self-imposed restrictions upon
its powers, 1. e., the leading principle of English constitutional lawthe sovereignty of Parliament-will become the sole principle of American constitutional law defining the relation between the state and national governments.
Whatever one may think of the minority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Stone, a better criticism of the majority opinion is not likely to
be produced.
The minority state certain general propositions which should have
controlling effect. 1. The power of the Court to declare a statute unconstitutional is always guided by the principle that "courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom,"
and by the further principle that, although the exercise of power by the
other two branches of government is subject to judicial restraint, selfrestraint is the only limitation upon judicial power. 2. The power of
Congress to levy an excise tax upon processing of agricultural products
is not questioned, and the levy is held invalid by the majority solely because of the use to which the proceeds of the exaction are put. 3. The
majority opinion does not deny that there is power in Congress, in the
existing emergency, to appropriate public money in aid of farmers by
reason of its power to tax and provide for the general welfare. 4. No
question of the power to levy a variable tax by fiat of the Secretary of
Agriculture or of an unauthorized delegation of legislative power is pre-
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sented, the schedule of rates having been adopted and confirmed by
Congress and any defect being thereby cured.
The opinion then proceeds to the issue on which the case turns, i. e.,
is a levy unquestionably within the taxing power of Congress to be
treated as invalid because "it is a step in a plan to regulate agricultural production and is thus a forbidden infringement of state power?"
The levy is not any the less an exercise of the taxing power because
it is intended to defray an expenditure for the general welfare rather
than for any other governmental purpose. It is not stated by the majority that the levy itself effects the regulation, and therefore, the Child
Labor Tax Case, 257 U. S. 20, Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, Lincoln v.
United States, 269 U. S. 5, 17, and United States v. Constantine, decided in December 11, 1935, are not in point, because m each of these
cases the levy was the instrument of regulation by reason of its coercive
effect on matters left to the control of the states. Here regulation is
accomplished by the method in which the proceeds of the levy are expended and would equally be accomplished by the use of any other
government funds.
The majority admit the expenditure of public funds to promote the
general welfare to be a substantive grant of power and do not deny
that Congress may lawfully appropriate funds for the benefit of farmers
and in aid of a program of curtailment, but they say there is coercion
and, in any case, Congress may not purchase compliance if it lacks the
power to command.
There is no coercion, for the threats of loss, not hope of gain, is the
essence of economic coercion. The hope of gain is the motive for securing curtailment of production.
There is no infringement of state powers by purchased regulation.
Upon the expenditure of public funds there is the limitation that they
be spent to promote the general welfare. Their expenditure usually
requires payment on such terms that this purpose will be served. "The
power of Congress to spend is inseparable from persuasion to action
over which Congress has no legislative control." It may not require
agriculture to be taught in state universities, but it may aid in teaching
by grants, and such grants may appropriately, if not necessarily, be on
condition that they be expended for the intended purpose. A contract
to use funds for the prescribed purpose is not different. The majority
assert these necessary incidents to the authorized expenditure of funds
to be limitations upon the power granted, and thus the principle long
ago established as to other enumerated powers of Congress is reversed
as to the power to tax and provide for the general welfare. "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
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Constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 421.
"It is a contradiction m terms to say that there is power to spend for
the national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would
justify the expenditure." The limitation leads to absurd consequences.
"The government may give money to the unemployed, but may not ask
that those who get it shall give labor m return, or even use it to support their families."
The power of the purse is a great one. Both its magnitude and its
existence in every civilized government were well understood by the
framers of the Constitution and were recognized by Hamilton and
Story whose views of the spending power as standing on a parity with
those of other powers specifically granted, have hitherto been generally
accepted. The suggestion that the power must now be curtailed because it may be abused does not rise to the dignity of argument. The
power has at least three limitations. 1. The purpose must be truly national. 2. The power may not be used to coerce action left to state
control. 3. The conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive provide further limitations, legislatures being "the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people m quite as great a degree
as the courts." Holmes, J., in Missouri, Kansas and Texas R. R. Co.
v.May, 194 U S. 267, 270.
A tortured construction is not justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless spending which might occur without the exercise of
judicial restraint. "Such suppositions are addressed to the mind accustomed to believe that it is the business of the courts to sit in judgment
on the wisdom of legislative action." Concluding, the minority opinion
states:
"Courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to
have capacity to govern. Congress and the courts both unhappily may falter
or be mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty. But interpretation of our great charter of government which proceeds on any assumption
that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is the exclusive
concern of any one of the three branches of government, or that it alone can
save them from destruction is far more likely, in the long run, 'to obliterate
the constituent members' of 'an indestructible union of indestructible states'
than the frank recognition that language, even of a constitution, may mean
what it says: that the power to tax and spend includes the power to relieve
a nation-wide economic maladjustment by conditional gifts of money."

It is interesting to speculate as to the effect upon the decision in this
case of certain remarks relating to "horse and buggy days," of the
slaughter of litle pigs, and of the training, experience, mental attitudes
and bents, and political and economic theories of the justices. The
science, art or game of psycho-analyzing judicial opinions is, however,
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largely speculation, and the comments of lawyers upon the opinions
must, in the present state of our knowledge, be restricted to legal reasoning which in itself may at times be abstruse.
It is proper, however, to give impartial impressions from reading the
opinions. The opinion of the majority is strained and forced. A new
problem is presented, the answer to which is obvious, but the process
of reasoning by which the result is to be reached is hard. It is not a
studied opinion. It shows haste. It is not a work of art. The logic of
the opinion is difficult to ascertain. It is influenced by the results which,
it is assumed, will follow any other determination.
The minority opinion, on the other hand, is likely to live as an example of the art of writing judicial opinions, and as one of the great
opinions m constitutional law. It is clear, forceful, and studied, and requires no interpretation to ascertain its meaning. It shows that the issues presented to the minority justices were not startling. They fit
neatly into principles which are conceived to be well established. The
issues are easy to decide. It took no straining of the processes of reasoning to reach the result. The opinion does not give the impression of
justifying a result determined upon before the reasons, by which the
result is to be reached, are settled.
The opinions raise an issue that is relevant to every case involving the
constitutionality of a statute-the proper function of the Court m determining the constitutionality of a statute, or, to put it in another way,
the weight that should be given to the judgment of Congress and the
Executive upon the constitutionality of the statute in question. The
opinion, or attitude, of a judge upon this question determines his decision. in most cases of this type. It was determinative in this case.
The issue arises, not from any lack of jurisdiction, a question settled
long ago in Marbury v. Madison, but because the powers delegated to
Congress require construction in cases in which judicial precedent is of
little assistance.* The issue is somewhat analogous to that of giving
effect to administrative rulings and determinations in the construction
of statutes. Courts have repeatedly attached great weight to them.
On this issue the opinions are clearly divided. Courts, say the minority, are only concerned with the power to enact statutes, not with their
wisdom. The exercise of power by Congress or the Executive is subject
to judicial restraint, but the exercise of judicial power is subject only to
self-restraint. The responsibility for preserving our institutions rests
upon the three coordinate branches of the government and not upon
any one of them. It may be concluded from the opinion of the minority
oThe power to declare a.state statute unconstitutional presents a different
question. Mr. justice Holmes has said: "I do not think the United States
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an act of Congress void.
I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
of the several states."
an to the la
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that only in extreme cases, in which the power sought to be exercised is
too remote from any grant of power, will an act of Congress be given
no legal effect.
The minority accuse the majority of passing upon the wisdom of the
Act. The majority deny this. The function of the Court, they say, is
solely to determine whether the Act is justified by any power granted.
It is evident, however, that they require more definite proof of a closer
relationship between the power exercised and that granted, and are
unwilling to give much weight to the judgment of Congress. They require the power to be much less remote from the power granted. They
are less willing to share responsibility with Congress.
In support of the minority view many arguments may be urged. Our
Constitution establishes a separation of powers of which the judicial is
one. This separation is merely a division of the labor of government,
and, in reality, is no guaranty of liberty, although it was regarded by
political theory at the time the Constitution was adopted as a doctrine
of liberty Each department of government has coordinate responsibility in upholding the framework of the Constitution. Only m the most
extreme cases should the judiciary override the judgment of Congress
as to its powers. If Congress errs in its judgment, the remedy is in the
ballot. If the Supreme Court errs, the remedy is in the cumbersome
process of amendment. The constitutionality of an act is passed upon
long after it has become legally effective. During the interval it is put
into operation, and fundamental changes often ensue. The Constitution was framed in a period before the Industrial Revolution, before the
functions of government began to expand, regardless of party, before
government was faced with the many intricate problems with which it
is now confronted, problems which, if they are to be solved by governmental action, will require, in practice, a new division of powers between state and nation. Yet the Constitution is broad in its language
and should be so construed as to permit a flexible adjustment to be
made to meet changed conditions. Unless we are to be continually
amending the Constitution (a remedy which is so slow that disastrous
results may follow before it is exercised), Congress must be given great
latitude in deciding its own power. While legislative incompetence has,
with many, become a firm belief, the remedy is with the electorate and
not the courts. Responsibility will tend to cure unwise and hasty action.
In support of the view of the majority many arguments may also
be urged. The duty to declare a law unconstitutional, if it is, should
not be evaded. The responsibility is in the Supreme Court, and it
should be there because that Court is more capable of deciding the
powers of Congress than Congress itself, and because divided authority
makes for inefficiency and uncertainty in government. If a power is
not granted to Congress, the Constitution can be amended, and the
slowness of that remedy is a good thing because it gives the people an
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opportunity to consider the desirability of amendment. Experience has
shown amendment not to be so difficult when public opinion is strong
in its favor. The Constitution conferring broad powers as it does,
there should be a check upon unwise and ill-considered action by Congress. While our government is founded upon a separation of powers,
it is also founded upon the theory of checks and balances as shown
by the veto power of the President and the treaty-making and appointive powers of the Senate.
An opinion upon this great issue should not be based upon whether
one is a so-called conservative or a so-called liberal, whether one favors
rugged individualism or a planned economy. A conservative Congress
may be denied powers by a liberal Supreme Court. That view should
be adopted which will make for the general welfare, and the determination by Congress as to what it considers conducive to the general welfare
should be given great weight by the Court. The determining factor
would seem to be that the development of a machine civilization and
the growth of a competitive economic system has made government
interference in our economic lives inevitable. The statutes of Congress, and of every state, and of the British Parliament, to name only
one foreign government, for the last fifty or more years show this.
It is a phenomenon of western civilization not generally appreciated.
Governmental functions are inevitably increasing at an accelerating
rate, regardless of party. If this is so, greater latitude must be given
to the judgment of Congress as to its powers. We are m a period
that requires flexibility rather than rigidity If we have lost faith
in the competence of Congress, our democracy has failed, and an immediate remedy should be sought which will prevent the destruction of
our civil liberties by the foreign doctrines of fascism or bolshevism.
The divergence of the two opinions upon the scope of the general
welfare clause is obvious. They agree that there is no delegated power
to legislate for the general welfare and that provision for the general
welfare, as such, must be accomplished by means of taxation and the
appropriation of public funds. The majority opinion holds, m determining the right of the receivers to object to the invalidity of the levy,
that the levy is not a tax because it is a mere incident to the regulation
of agriculture, which regulation by means of the expenditure of money
is found to be unauthorized. It is not a tax because of the illegality
of the appropriation. If the appropriation were legal, it would seem
to follow that the tax was unobjectionable. The issue, therefore,
is whether the devices adopted by the Act for the expenditure of public
funds come within the phrase "provide for " *
general welfare
of the United States."
On this issue the opinions diverge only after agreeing that the clause
embodies an indep3ndent substantive grant of power and that the
authority to spend need not be justified under any other enumerated
power.
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The majority say it is unnecessary to define the scope of the clause
because the Act encroaches on the powers reserved to the states, and
this is so whether the Act is coercive, which they believe it to be, or
purchases compliance, for Congress cannot purchase that which it has
no power to command. What are the powers reserved to the states?
They are the powers not delegated to Congress. The majority is thus
forced into a dilemma which the opinion does not altogether solvc.
Assuming the power to appropriate for the general welfare to have
meaning and to be an independent one as the majority do, then one
is forced to decide whether the Act comes within the limits of that
power, or abandon the clause as an independent source of power. In
effect they do define a limit to this independent power-the destruction
of the lines between state and federal government and the reconstitution of Congress into a parliament. This limit, which is indeed a
proper one, for otherwise the specific delegation of powers to Congress
would be meaningless, the majority find the Act to reach. Impliedly,
they say the Act goes far beyond anything which the application of
the doctrine of implied powers established by McCu~loch v. Maryland
would justify The opinion as written is unfortunate.
If this is the true logic of the opinion, the decision obviously rests
upon sound judgment as to the effect of the Act and other possible acts
of a similar nature.
Without approving the wisdom and policy of the Act, one is forced
to the conclusion that the power of the purse, although great, does
not embrace the power to obliterate any division of powers between
the state and federal governments. Congress can never become the
British Parliament by this process. Neither in legal theory nor in
practice is the power to purchase the power to command. The power
to purchase is limited by its source-the purse. The ability to collect
taxes or borrow money has very definite limitations. The power of
the purse can be used for regulation only in unusual instances. That
its use may invade the customary division of powers is true. A similar
invasion has been made with the sanction of the Supreme Court in
the exercise of power to regulate interstate commerce. Neither custom nor the failure to exercise power granted is any limitation upon
the authority of Congress.
The minority admit that, if the Act is coercive, it is unconstitutional. They deny that it is, for regulation is accomplished by the
hope of gain rather than the fear of loss. Thus judges occasionally
are compelled to be psychologists, and the minority opinion may be
said to turn upon human motives. This is not the place for the discussion of free will. One is inclined to believe that the Act was
founded upon the hope of gain and was not coercive. At any rate it
does not provide the usual sanctions, which are associated with coercion-fine, imprisonment, or both, or some form of penality. In the
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present confused state of the science of psychology, it is somewhat
dangerous, especially in the field of constitutional law, to draw conclusions based upon human motivation. Forms of coercion have been
known to the law since ancient time, and it is too uncertain a matter
to say that there is or is not coercion unless some form of coercion
known to the law, or similar to it, is or is not used.
The minority opinion proceeds with clear logic, starting with the
premise that the power to appropriate for the general welfare is an
independent source of power. It simply applies the doctrine of implied
powers established by McCulloch v. Maryland. Although their judgment in applying it would seem to be sound, it is not at all clear that,
as they say, the doctrine has been reversed by the majority in its
application to the welfare clause. In reality the majority did recognize
it as applicable to the clause but found the Act to go beyond any
implication of power in it. In the exercise of judgment upon this
point it is evident that the majority and minority were both controlled
by their divergent views upon the function of the Court. The majority may have been influenced by the wisdom of the Act as a solution
of the farm problem. The minority judges were m conference with
the majority on this case. We were not. They also read the majority
opinion before the minority was written. The majority were certainly
influenced by the type of legislation of which the Act was an example.
The decision, moreover, cannot be said to prohibit all forms of
regulation in connection with the expenditure of money for the general
welfare. There is a vast difference between regulation of the type
effected by the Act and other regulation cited in the minority opinion,
as for example, grants in aid of agricultural education on condition
that it be so used. The majority would have no difficulty in upholding
such a grant.
This case alone will probably not lead to any amendment of the
Constitution which will expand or make definite the powers of Congress, for the spending of money to procure regulation is limited in its
scope. An amendment will only come as a result of a strong public
opinion to give to Congress the power by command to regulate agriculture and industry It is more likely to lead to restrictions upon the
powers of the Supreme Court.

RECENT CASE NOTES
TRIAL-INFORMING JURY OF LIABILrrY INSURANCE-CURING OF PREJUDICE.-In

tort action against motorist, plaintiff recovered $3,400.00 for death of twelve
year old girl. Appellant assigns alleged misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in
eliciting testimony from his witness on redirect examination that insurance
agent had investigated accident after questioning prospective jurors on voir

